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Stefano Bacin
Kant’s Idea of Human Dignity: 
Between Tradition and Originality
Abstract: This paper focuses on the relationship between Kant and the traditional 
view of dignity. I argue that some amendments to Sensen’s description of the tra-
ditional paradigm enable us to see more clearly both where Kant adheres to the 
latter and where his view is original. First, a consideration of Pufendorf’s use 
of dignity suggests (1) that, contrary to Sensen’s reconstruction, the traditional 
paradigm does not entail a connection between dignity and duties to oneself, 
and (2) that Pufendorf’s understanding of dignity as a kind of esteem, as opposed 
to price, provides a crucial mediation between the traditional view and Kant’s 
view. Finally, I argue that the traditional understanding of dignity also includes 
a subordinate justificatory element that helps to explain Kant’s use of dignity in 
the Doctrine of Virtue. 
Keywords: dignity, natural law, Pufendorf, esteem.
DOI 10.1515/kant-2015-0008
1
Interest in the idea of human dignity has led to several investigations of its history. 
Especially in recent times, study of the notion’s ancient and early modern roots 
has been pursued in the name of providing not only a much-needed clarification 
of the term, but also an antidote to what has been called the “Kantian hegem-
ony” over the current understanding of the idea.¹ Investigating the notion’s pre-
Kantian significance helps to put the Kantian view in perspective, and perhaps 
even to reveal alternative conceptual possibilities.² The historical dimension of 
the issue is also central to Oliver Sensen’s interpretation of Kant’s view on human 
1 See Debes, Remy: “Dignity’s Gauntlet”. In: Philosophical Perspectives 23, 2009, 45–78: 49.
2 See e.g. Rosen, Michael: Dignity. Its History and Meaning. Cambridge/London 2012.
Dr. Stefano Bacin: Università Vita Salute San Raffaele, Facoltà di Filosofia, Via Olgettina, 58, 
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dignity. According to Sensen, the alleged “Kantian hegemony” is not genuinely 
Kantian, but a later development. That is, according to Sensen, Kant knew and 
adhered to the traditional use of the idea of human dignity.³ In fact, this is one 
of his main contentions, as the contrast between two models of dignity is crucial 
to his reading. While most recent interpreters regard Kant as the source of what 
Sensen calls the “contemporary paradigm”, Sensen views Kant’s conception of 
dignity as originating in the traditional paradigm.
One of the main points of Sensen’s general argument thus takes a histori-
cal route, since he identifies the defining features of the traditional paradigm in 
Cicero, Leo the Great, and Pico della Mirandola, and compares them with Kant. 
Sensen’s goal is to provide a clarification of Kant’s conception of human dignity; 
he does not endeavour to present either a full reconstruction of the pre-Kantian 
history of the idea or selected chapters from this history. Yet one of his examina-
tion’s many merits is that it convincingly shows that a proper understanding 
of Kant’s view must take into consideration its broader philosophical context. 
Accordingly, his approach is not merely internal to Kant’s writings (although 
his impressive analysis covers virtually every relevant passage); in addition, it 
involves a historical dimension. Sensen claims that the traditional paradigm of 
dignity is characterized by four features: (1) “Dignity” does not denote any spe-
cific property, but merely a higher rank; (2) Dignity has two stages – an initial 
one, where “dignity” denotes an ability, and a realized one, where it picks out 
the proper development of that ability; (3) Dignity yields not rights but duties; 
(4) Dignity primarily entails duties to oneself (cf. p. 161  ff.). The same features, 
Sensen argues, are distinctive of Kant’s view; he therefore “adheres to the tradi-
tional paradigm of dignity” (p. 164), and “his usage of ‘dignity’ always conforms” 
to it (p. 180).
Interpreting Kant’s view in this perspective is enlightening, as it counters the 
interpretive risk of projecting later presuppositions back onto Kant. I believe that 
the contrast between the traditional and the contemporary paradigms is persua-
sive, as is the claim that Kant’s view must be understood in connection with the 
former. However, Sensen’s claims prompt questions concerning the precise rela-
tionship between Kant and the traditional paradigm. Does Kant merely adhere to 
it, or does his view represent a further development in some respect? Or should 
we suppose that his originality lies in other points, which he combines with a 
notion of dignity that does not represent an innovation per se? This issue is not 
merely historically relevant, since addressing it would substantiate the distinc-
3 Cf. Sensen, Oliver: Kant on Human Dignity. Berlin/Boston 2011, 165, 175, 180, 211. Hereafter 
references to Sensen’s book are given as page numbers in brackets.
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tion between Kant’s view and the contemporary paradigm. In the following, I 
shall make a few remarks that might help to complete, or amend in some respect, 
Sensen’s most welcome interpretation of Kant’s stance toward the traditional 
paradigm of dignity. I shall suggest that the traditional paradigm might be char-
acterized slightly differently from the way in which Sensen describes it, and that 
key missing aspects provide valuable insight into Kant’s view.
2
In his reconstruction of the features of the traditional paradigm, Sensen draws on 
Cicero, Leo the Great and Pico della Mirandola, who are understandably chosen 
because of their role in the history of the idea of dignity. Sensen does not aim 
to cover this history fully, but if his analysis is to provide a clue for interpret-
ing Kant, it might be necessary also to consider other – and especially later – 
thinkers. It is likely that the many developments in the history of moral ideas 
spanning the three centuries between Pico’s De hominis dignitate (1486) and 1785 
influenced the notion of dignity in interesting ways. What is at issue, though, 
is not the identification of the authors and works that might have been Kant’s 
sources; rather, the question is whether, prior to Kant, the traditional paradigm 
contained any significant developments beyond those provided by Cicero, Leo 
the Great and Pico. With this aim in view, the examination should be extended, at 
the very least, to a central stream in the practical philosophy of the early modern 
age: namely, to natural law theory.
To substantiate my suggestion, I shall limit myself to a few remarks on Pufen-
dorf. In his enormously influential writings, Pufendorf’s use of “dignity” follows 
the traditional paradigm insofar as the word denotes not some metaphysical prop-
erty, but human beings’ superiority to other creatures: “the very word ‘man’ is 
thought to contain a certain dignity, and the ultimate as well as the most effec-
tive argument deflecting others’ rude insults is taken to be: ‘Surely I am not a 
dog or a beast but as much a man as you.’”⁴ Interestingly, one of the interpretive 
claims persuasively argued in a recent essay on Pufendorf is that “the dignity 
Pufendorf attributed to human nature did not indicate the Kantian idea of abso-
lute and incomparable worth but only a comparative superiority in relation to 
4 Pufendorf, Samuel: De jure naturae et gentium (1672), III.2.1. English translation in: The Poli-
tical Writings of Samuel Pufendorf. Ed. by Craig L. Carr. Trans. by Michael J. Seidler. New York/
Oxford 1994, 159.
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other creatures”.⁵ On Sensen’s reading, there is no such distinction. On the con-
trary, Sensen’s interpretation helps us to acknowledge the continuity between 
Pufendorf (and later natural law theorists) and Kant. However, consideration of 
Pufendorf does not merely add further support for the connection between Kant 
and the traditional paradigm, but also illuminates relevant additional elements 
of the paradigm itself.
Pufendorf’s view suggests, first, that some significant thinkers who employ 
the traditional paradigm give prominence to rights, which is contrary to Sensen’s 
contention (cf. p. 163). For Pufendorf, and for most natural law theorists, human 
beings’ higher rank allows them to be moral subjects, which entails basic subjec-
tive rights – if only the right to be “esteemed” as subjects. Dignity is a key notion 
for Pufendorf, particularly in his argument for the constitutive equality of human 
beings (an equality that entails rights): “Since human nature belongs equally to 
all men” – that is, they have the same dignity compared to other creatures – “and 
since one cannot lead a social life with someone by whom one is not esteemed 
at least as a man, it follows as a precept of the natural law that ‘Everyone must 
esteem and treat other men as his natural equals, or as men in the same sense 
as he.’”⁶ As is clear here, rights require a basic normative premise (as Sensen 
points out), but so do duties. This conception of the relationship between dignity, 
duties and rights is thus different from Kant’s view, if in Kant rights “follow from 
a duty” (p. 169). This is a highly complicated matter that cannot be adequately 
clarified here. Still, it is important to stress that the traditional paradigm can 
include explicit rights claims. This feature cannot be appreciated if we refer only 
to earlier thinkers, who operate prior to (or, in Pico’s case, independently of) the 
development of the idea of subjective rights that occurred between the time of 
the later Scholastics and the early modern age. Stressing the subordinate role 
of rights may reveal an important contrast to the contemporary paradigm, but it 
does not contribute to a fully adequate description of the traditional paradigm 
and Kant’s relation to it.
Many of Pufendorf’s claims in the same context show, moreover, that it might 
not be correct to consider the primacy of duties to oneself as a defining feature of 
the traditional paradigm, as Sensen does. In the same passage where he defines 
dignity, Pufendorf presents the appeal to dignity as an “argument deflecting 
others’ rude insults”. He then argues that “someone who pays no heed to natural 
equality, and favors one person over another, both insults and injures the one 
5 Saastamoinen, Kari: “Pufendorf on Natural Equality, Human Dignity, and Self-Esteem”. In: 
Journal of the History of Ideas 71, 2010, 39–62: 41.
6 Pufendorf, De jure naturae et gentium, III. 2.1; Political Writings, 159.
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being less esteemed by not granting him his due and disparaging the dignity 
given him by nature”. On this view, the demand “that one treats them as equals 
and grants neither of them something ahead of the other, except insofar as he has 
acquired a special right to it”⁷ is not grounded in a self-regarding duty. Here the 
“primary focus” is not “the realization of one’s own dignity”, contrary to Sensen’s 
characterization (p. 164), which might have been conditioned by the authors he 
considers. If the traditional paradigm is in fact neutral as to this point, it might 
be that Kant’s connection between dignity and duties to oneself, highlighted by 
Sensen, is in fact original with regard to the traditional conception.
The connection between dignity and rights and duties in Pufendorf suggests 
a more general, and more important point, though. Here dignity is understood 
not merely as a higher rank, but as a higher stance in moral terms. On Pufen-
dorf’s view, “dignity” does not belong to the natural order, but to the moral order. 
Elaborating the traditional paradigm, he conceives of dignity not as a natural 
property, but as a kind of esteem, namely “the value of persons in communal life 
according to which they can be equated or compared with others, and ranked 
before or after them”.⁸ Esteem, which the 1711 German version of Pufendorf’s 
main work notably renders as “Würdigkeit und Achtung”, is contrasted with price: 
“There is evidently no small kinship between the two noblest kinds of moral 
quantities, esteem and price. The former is taken into consideration in the case 
of persons and the latter in the case of things, because in communal life persons 
are evaluated by the former and things by the latter.”⁹ A price is given to things 
to express what they are worth, in some respect; analogously, esteem makes pos-
sible comparison and differentiation with regard to the status of human beings, 
for instance with regard to their merit. This provides the background for Kant’s 
repeated distinction between dignity and price, which comes up in some of 
the most crucial passages on dignity, both in the Groundwork and in the Doc-
trine of Virtue. In the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant even distinguishes between three 
kinds of price. Instead of simply contrasting it with dignity, he here applies the 
distinction between the “ordinary value” of the physical properties of an object 
(pretium vulgare), the “extrinsic value” that a human being can have “for his use-
fulness (pretium usus)” and the “preeminent” value (pretium eminens) of money 
as “the universal medium of exchange” (see MS, AA 06: 434). More clearly than 
the Groundwork, this passage reveals that Kant draws on corresponding distinc-
7 Ibid., III.2.5, Political Writings, 162. Cf. III.3.1.
8 Ibid., VIII.4.1; Political Writings, 253. Cf. Pufendorf, Samuel: Vom Natur- und Völcker-Rechte. 
Anderer Theil. Frankfurt am Main 1711, 844.
9 Ibid.
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tions made by Pufendorf and his many followers.¹⁰ By insisting on the contrast 
between dignity and price, Kant stresses a Pufendorfian point: dignity is not a 
natural property, but a kind of value ascription.¹¹ The difference between dignity 
and price is said to take place only “in the kingdom of ends” (see GMS, AA 04: 
434) because it occurs only under moral laws.
These brief remarks show the specific significance of natural law for our 
understanding of Kant’s view in light of the traditional paradigm. Consideration 
of the natural law model makes possible a more precise characterization of that 
paradigm. More importantly, Pufendorf’s natural law view provides the concep-
tual means for further developments. That dignity is a kind of value ascription 
that does not simply result from natural properties, and so does not belong to the 
natural order, is an extension of the traditional paradigm that is very significant 
for Kant. The natural law theories display important elements that point towards 
Kant’s original innovation in this respect. By giving prominence to the contrast 
between existimatio and price, Pufendorf, like the later natural law theorists, pro-
vides an indispensable mediation that enables Kant to introduce his main inno-
vation in the conception of dignity: that is, the determination of dignity in terms 
of lawgiving. Referring to Pufendorf as a key figure of natural law theory enables 
us to see that Kant, instead of merely following the traditional paradigm, elabo-
rates it in an original way. Sensen’s insistence on Kant’s adherence to the tradi-
tion counters current readings, but it obscures this aspect.
3
Although it is not included in the four features highlighted by Sensen, a further 
aspect seems to belong to the traditional paradigm. As Sensen’s exposition 
stresses, on the traditional view “dignity” is not a metaphysical value property 
and does not constitute the foundation of morality. The justification of moral 
demands is grounded not on dignity itself, but on different normative premises 
(cf. p. 163). This is a crucial feature for Kant, for which he constructs new argu-
ments (cf. p. 144, 199). However, a remarkable passage, in which Locke mentions 
different strategies for justifying moral demands, suggests that some specifi-
10 Cf. Pufendorf, De jure naturae et gentium, V.1.3, 192. Pufendorf also provides a definition of 
the pretium affectionis, that is, the “fancy price” (Affectionspreis) mentioned in the Groundwork 
(GMS, AA 04: 435): cf. De jure, V.1.7.
11 This is especially apparent in MS, AA 06: 434, as Kant describes the different sorts of pretium 
as kinds of value.
Bereitgestellt von | De Gruyter / TCS
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 24.03.15 11:22
 Kant’s Idea of Human Dignity: Between Tradition and Originality    103
cation is needed: “if a Christian, who has the view of happiness and misery in 
another life, be asked why man must keep his word? he will give this as a reason: 
Because God, who has the power of eternal life and death, requires it of us. But 
if a Hobbist be asked why, he will answer, because the public requires it, and the 
Leviathan will punish you if you do not. And if one of the old philosophers had 
been asked, he would have answered, because it was dishonest, below the dignity 
of a man, and opposite to virtue, the highest perfection of human nature, to do 
otherwise.”¹² In Locke’s reference to Aristotelian naturalists, it appears that the 
most traditional conception is one in which the appeal to dignity serves to justify 
duties. I suggest that recognizing the feature Locke highlights as belonging to the 
traditional conception enables us to understand a significant and controversial 
aspect of Kant’s conception of dignity.
Indeed, the traditional paradigm does not appeal to dignity as a ground of 
morality. On the traditional approach, the first question is rather what is the ground 
of dignity itself, or what features make it the case that human beings rank higher 
than other creatures on the order of being. The various positions might differ with 
regard to this question, but not with regard to how each understands the argumen-
tative role played by dignity in the context of moral obligations. This approach can 
be seen at work in two examples from the 18th century. From within his broadly 
Platonic position, Richard Price argues that knowledge is what “raises one being 
upon another” and “gives us our distinction as rational creatures”. Knowledge, 
which enables the soul “to perceive moral obligations”, is “the foundation of 
our whole dignity”. Since we must nurture this capacity, “the obligations under 
which we lie to this [the soul] are very apparent. Our regard to ourselves makes 
it absolutely necessary”.¹³ Analogously, Georg Joachim Zollikofer argues that 
the first questions to be answered are: “In what does the dignity of man consist? 
Or, what does give him the worth he has?” “The greater the dignity of man, […] 
the stronger is he obligated to affirm it, and to think and act according to it.”¹⁴
These examples of the use of dignity in Kant’s time, clearly belonging to the 
traditional paradigm, show that, while dignity does not constitute the foundation 
of morality – which is always presupposed (as given, for instance, by the order of 
Creation) –, the appeal to dignity plays a different argumentative role. On the pre-
supposition of a normative premise (e.g. that morality consists in living according 
12 Locke, John: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, I.3.5.
13 Price, Richard: The Nature and Dignity of the Human Soul […]. London 1766, 13–15.
14 Zollikofer, Georg Joachim: Predigten über die Würde des Menschen, und den Werth der vor-
nehmsten Dingen, die zur menschlichen Glückseligkeit gehören, oder dazu gerechnet werden, Bd. I. 
Leipzig 1784, 8 and 29.
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to nature), the higher rank of moral subjects has normative implications. Dignity 
thus plays a subordinate justificatory role, which includes a motivational, exhor-
tative aspect; the appeal to dignity is supposed to have some efficacy for the 
addressee, because it is easier to grasp than the full foundational argument. As 
Garve once wrote to Zollikofer in a discussion on Kant’s moral philosophy, “One 
is rather more readily able to grasp that an action is useful or conforms to our 
human dignity than that it is capable of being made the model and ideal of a uni-
versal law”.¹⁵ This kind of justification is also hinted at in Pufendorf, in a passage 
I quoted earlier, where referring to human dignity is said to be “the ultimate as 
well as the most effective argument deflecting others’ rude insults”,¹⁶ that is, the 
argument expressing in the clearest terms that certain constraints apply to our 
conduct towards others, which does not mean that dignity provides the ground of 
moral obligations. This specific justificatory role for the notion of dignity should 
therefore be regarded as a further feature of the traditional paradigm.
It is worth paying attention to this not just for the sake of an exact charac-
terization of the traditional paradigm, but because it helps us to better under-
stand Kant’s view. Consideration of the traditional use suggests a solution to an 
interpretive issue regarding the role dignity plays in the Groundwork and in the 
Doctrine of Virtue. Because it does not appear in a completely uniform way in the 
two works, some interpreters detect a modification in Kant’s conception. This is 
especially relevant because interpreters who suggest this reading are willing to 
accept Sensen’s account of the Groundwork, but they hold that the Doctrine of 
Virtue must be understood differently. Whereas in 1785 Kant speaks of dignity in 
connection with the Formula of Autonomy and ascribes dignity only to “morality, 
and humanity insofar as it is capable of morality”,¹⁷ the claims in the Doctrine 
of Virtue yield a partially different picture, as Kant here equates dignity with the 
status of an end in itself. To quote one central passage: “a human being re-
garded as a person, that is, as the subject of a morally practical reason, is […] to 
be valued […] as an end in itself, that is, he possesses a dignity (an absolute inner 
worth) by which he exacts respect for himself from all other rational beings in the 
world”.¹⁸ Referring to this passage, it has been suggested that “another concep-
15 Briefwechsel zwischen Christian Garve und Georg Joachim Zollikofer. Breslau 1804, 377.
16 Pufendorf, De jure naturae et gentium, III.2.1; Political Writings, 159.
17 GMS, AA 04: 435: “Sittlichkeit und die Menschheit, so fern sie derselben fähig ist”.
18 MS, AA 06: 434  f.: “der Mensch, als Person betrachtet, d. i. als Subject einer moralisch=
praktischen Vernunft, ist […] als Zweck an sich selbst zu schätzen, d. i. er besitzt eine Würde 
(einen absoluten innern Werth), wodurch er allen andern vernünftigen Weltwesen Achtung für 
ihn abnöthigt”; cf. MS, AA 06: 462.
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tion” of dignity comes into play here, resulting from an “individualistic turn”.¹⁹ 
This reading presupposes, however, that in the context of the Formula of Auton-
omy dignity has a communitarian sense, which is not really convincing.²⁰ With 
regard to the same passage, Stephen Darwall has claimed that the idea of dignity 
in the Doctrine of Virtue includes a “second-personal authority”, in contrast to the 
Groundwork.²¹ A right to “exact respect” would now belong to dignity, expanding 
the earlier view. Darwall’s reading, insofar as it is meant as an interpretive point 
and not as an independent thesis, contrasts, first, with the textual fact that the 
main passage from which Darwall draws does not concern any duty to others, 
but introduces the treatment of servility as a violation of oneself. Second, dignity 
in the Doctrine of Virtue does not belong to an argument for a new metaethical 
thesis, but only to the exposition of specific obligations. Nevertheless, although 
they are not convincing on their own terms, these readings call the continuity of 
Kant’s view into question.
Sensen is well aware of this issue, and his position is unambiguous. He 
detects no break between the two works. About the Doctrine of Virtue, he claims: 
“even in this context Kant talks about the dignity of humanity (as the capacity to 
be moral). Throughout the Doctrine of Virtue Kant’s point is that one should not 
deprive oneself of the prerogative of being able to act freely (i.e., in accordance 
with morality). This is not a new justification or application of morality, but is 
just a different way of saying that one should act as the Categorical Imperative 
commands” (p. 193). Now, while I do think that the notion maintains the same 
meaning, this remark does not seem to me to capture its full significance. Indeed, 
there is a difference to be accounted for. I suggest that the variation concerns the 
argumentative role played by the notion of dignity, and that this can be clearly 
seen upon consideration of the traditional paradigm. While the Groundwork pro-
vides a new determination of dignity by linking it to Kant’s novel account of the 
foundations of morality, i.e. to the thesis of the autonomy of the will, the Doctrine 
of Virtue “explains what should be respected in others”, as Sensen points out 
(p. 199). In doing this, Kant gives the same argumentative role to dignity that it 
had traditionally played and, much like previous authors, uses it as a shorthand, 
subordinate justification for specific obligations. Kant conceives of the ground of 
19 Cf. von der Pfordten, Dietmar: “On the Dignity of Man in Kant”. In: Philosophy 84, 2009, 
371–391: 388  ff.
20 Against such a reading of the Groundwork, see Flikschuh, Katrin: “Kant’s Kingdom of Ends: 
Metaphysical, Not Political”. In: Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical 
Guide. Ed. by Jens Timmermann. Cambridge 2010, 119–139.
21 Darwall, Stephen: “Kant on Respect, Dignity, and the Duty of Respect”. In: Kant’s Ethics of 
Virtue. Ed. by Monika Betzler. Berlin/New York 2008, 175–199: 188–192.
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dignity quite differently, but still appeals to the higher rank of moral subjects as 
an “ultimate argument”, in Pufendorf’s terms. Therefore, while it is fully correct 
to insist, with Sensen, on dignity’s not being the foundation of moral demands, 
this seems to obscure another feature of the traditional paradigm to which Kant 
adheres. To the degree that this paradigm is understood in its complexity, a com-
parison with it makes possible a greater understanding of this aspect of Kant’s 
conception of dignity, revealing points of both continuity and difference.
I believe that one of the many virtues of Sensen’s enlightening interpretation 
is that it stresses Kant’s reliance on the traditional conception. However, a richer 
characterization of that paradigm and of Kant’s relation to it would improve our 
understanding of Kant’s view. Since the traditional paradigm becomes more 
complex in the context of early modern natural law theories, a comparison with 
them is helpful as a means of clarifying Kant’s elaboration of the paradigm. 
Kant’s enhanced conception of dignity, then, enables him to develop the tradi-
tional conception of dignity in the doctrine of duties from within a new philo-
sophical framework.
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